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Joint Publication 3-33 Joint Task Force Headquarters 30 July 2012 PREFACE 1. Scope This publication provides joint doctrine for the formation and employment of a joint task force (JTF) headquarters to command and control joint operations. It provides guidance on the JTF headquarters’ role in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing JTF operations. 2. Purpose This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military coordination with other US Government departments and agencies during operations and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 3. Application a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies. b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine i Preface and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine. For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: WILLIAM E. GORTNEY VADM, USN Director, Joint Staff ii JP 3-33 SUMMARY OF CHANGES REVISION OF JP 3-33 DATED 16 FEBRUARY 2007 Reduces redundancies and improves continuity between joint publication (JP) 3-33, Joint Taskforce Headquarters, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. Reorganizes chapters into a logical flow for ease of reading and understanding the organization and development of a joint task force (JTF) headquarters (HQ). Expands on the discussion of individual augmentation and the joint manning document when developing the JTF HQ. Adds detailed discussion on different types of JTF HQ to provide an in-depth understanding on how and why JTFs are stood up and organized. Eliminates discussions on subordinate component commands in Chapter III, “Joint Task Force Subordinate Commands,” to reduce redundancy with other JPs and bring this publication in-line with current approved and emerging joint doctrine. Adds major discussion and an appendix on joint task force-state to provide guidance on command and control relationships and responsibility differences between federal and state troops in a domestic response situation. Incorporates appropriate changes with the disestablishment of US Joint Forces Command and the reorganization of the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command under United States Transportation Command. Adds an appendix on JTF-Capable HQ that provides a framework and considerations for forming and sustaining the readiness of a JTF HQ within the Department of Defense. Removes the appendix for contract support and contractor management planning since JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support, provides this information more extensively. iii Summary of Changes Intentionally Blank iv JP 3-33 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... ix CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION TO THE JOINT TASK FORCE General ....................................................................................................................... I-1 Joint Functions and Joint Staff Directorates .............................................................. I-4 Interorganizational Considerations ............................................................................ I-7 Joint Task Force-State ............................................................................................. I-10 CHAPTER II FORMING AND ORGANIZING THE JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS General ......................................................................................................................II-1 SECTION A. Forming the Joint Task Force Headquarters ............................................II-1 The Preferred Approach to Forming the Joint Task Force Headquarters .................II-1 Options for Augmenting the Headquarters ...............................................................II-2 SECTION B. COMMAND AND STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES ..................................II-6 Command and Staff Roles and Responsibilities .......................................................II-6 Staff Organization ...................................................................................................II-10 Liaison Personnel ....................................................................................................II-14 CHAPTER III JOINT TASK FORCE SUBORDINATE COMMANDS Task Organization and Common Responsibilities ................................................. III-1 Service Component Commands ............................................................................. III-2 Functional Component Commands ........................................................................ III-3 Subordinate Joint Task Forces ................................................................................ III-5 CHAPTER IV JOINT TASK FORCE COMMAND AND CONTROL General .................................................................................................................... IV-1 Joint Task Force Headquarters Command and Control Factors ............................. IV-1 Joint Task Force Headquarters Management Process .......................................... IV-14 CHAPTER V JOINT TASK FORCE MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL General ..................................................................................................................... V-1 v Table of Contents Organization ............................................................................................................ V-1 Responsibilities ........................................................................................................ V-2 Personnel Planning ................................................................................................ V-12 CHAPTER VI JOINT TASK FORCE INTELLIGENCE General .................................................................................................................... VI-1 Organization ........................................................................................................... VI-1 Responsibilities ....................................................................................................... VI-4 Intelligence Disciplines and Sources ...................................................................... VI-7 Collection Management .......................................................................................... VI-7 National Intelligence Support Team ....................................................................... VI-8 Supported Combatant Commander’s Joint Intelligence Operations Center ........... VI-8 Joint Intelligence Support Element ......................................................................... VI-8 Intelligence Centers and Other Support ................................................................ VI-10 CHAPTER VII JOINT TASK FORCE OPERATIONS General ................................................................................................................... VII-1 Organization .......................................................................................................... VII-1 Responsibilities .................................................................................................... VII-12 CHAPTER VIII JOINT TASK FORCE LOGISTICS General ................................................................................................................. VIII-1 Organization ........................................................................................................ VIII-1 Responsibilities .................................................................................................... VIII-3 Authority .............................................................................................................. VIII-6 Planning Considerations ...................................................................................... VIII-6 Multinational Logistic Considerations ...............................................................
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